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Abstract 
This paper is divided into two parts, namely, Part I- deals with two important 
concepts, namely, the Development of Corporate Criminal Liability (Chapter Two) 
and the Development of the Corporate Environmental Crime (Chapter Tltree). Part
II- deals with the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination as a potential evidential
problem in Corporate Environment Criminal Liability (Cltapter Four). Chapter Five 
deals with recommendations and suggestions to our Environment Criminal Liability. 
Our Final Constitution had massive impact m the different fields of law, and 
environmental law ,vas not an exception to these developments. One such 
development or should be termed as a problem, in the context of this paper, is the 
privilege against self- incrimination afforded to corporate offenders in terms of our 
Final Constitution. 
As a result this paper undertakes an environmental analysis on how the privilege, if 
extended to corporations, may pose an evidential problem in corporate environment 
criminal prosecution against corporate offenders. Thus a comparative study is also 
undertaken with an objective of viewing how other jurisdictions dealt with this issue, 
and also to recommend suggestions to our country on how to deal with this matter. By 
way of conclusion it is suggested that our judiciary, if the matter do end up in court, 
should clarify vividly whether the privilege is extended to corporations or not. This 
matter, it is suggested, should be decided from an environmental law perspective and 
not from a criminal law perspective. 
Part I- The D:evelopment of Corporate Criminal Law m an 
Environmental Context. 
Chapter One:. Introduction. 
Corporations occupy a central position in our modern society. As a result_ in view of their 
immense power, their activities are coming under scrutiny. Hence most corporations, if 
not all, are making increasing use of environmental audits or self- auditing/ review 
processes in assessing or evaluating whether their activities are not directly or indirectly 
harming the environment. 
In a general context envirl'mment self- auditing is a systematic and documented, periodic 
and objective examination involving interviews, analyses, tests and review of 
documentation to obtain relevant evidence on which to evaluate performance of a 
corporation 1• This review process is encouraging to corporations because it put the 
operations of corporations in line with the requirements of environmental legislation. As 
a result the increasing use of the self- auditing process has established it as a common 
practice among the corporations. The International' Standards Organisation (ISO) sets the 
environmental audits standards used by the corporations, and this includes, but not 
limited to, the ISO 14010- 140122 . Although one of the purposes of these environmental 
audits standards is to assist the corporations in complying with the different environment 
legislation of a country, it indirectly also assist the corporations in minimising their 
degradation of the environment. 
------ - -------
! Glazewski J Environmental Law in South Africa 2000 at 294.
There is no doubt that this is a step in the right direction, but the usage of this review 
process also gives rise to some problems. One such problem is the incriminating evidence 
that may be discovered in those audit documents when checked by the government 
officials. This may be evidence showing that the corporation was negligent in preventing 
damage to the environment or that the corporation has a lax approach when it comes to 
compliance with environmental legislation. 
Whatever the case may be. this problem, therefore. give rise to three important questions 
in situations where thf' government or state wants to institute criminal action against the 
corporation for the latter's alleged environmental crime: 
► Whether the right to a fair trial should be extended to corporations in cases of
environmental criminal prosecution? if so;
, Are corporations compelled to produce their environmental auditing records for 
the purpose of environmental criminal prosecution? if so; 
;;, Are the corporation's directors allowed to claim the privilege against self­
incrimination in cases where such records wilJ expose them to environmental 
criminal prosecution? 
And this is due to the [act that corporations, just like any natural person offenders, from a 
South African context, are entitled to the right to a fair trial (section 35(3) 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). These rights include, but not limited to, the 
right to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to give self- incriminating 
� Ibid, at 295. 
2 
evidence3 . This is cvid,�:1ced by the fact that juristic or artificial persons are entitled to the 
rights contained in Chapter 2 of our Final Constitution 4. 
From the above, it may be seen that these rights when invoked by corporations may raise 
a serious evidential problem. Thus this problem is/ was not confine to our borders, other 
jurisdiction addressed this problem. Countries like the United States of America, Canada, 
New Zealand, United Kingdom and Australia tackled and addressed this problem. Hence 
we cannot escape the possibility that it may also be triggered here in our country. 
Hence this paper will argue or show that the privilege against self- incrimination, at least 
from an environmental law context, should not be extended to corporations. As a result in 
Chapter Two and Three will focus and discuss in details the development of two 
concepts, namely, corporate criminal liability and corporate environmental crime 
respectively. Chapter Four will examine the privilege against self- incrimination within 
the context of corporations. The current state of the law in South Africa is also examined. 
A discussion indicating the possible conflict between access to infom1ation and the 
privilege against self- incrimination is also undertaken within the context of our 
Constitution and legislation. Lessons that can be learned from other _jurisdictions, which 
dealt with this problem, are highlighted. Lastly, Chapter Five by way of a conclusion 
suggests recommendations and suggestions to our criminal environmental law. 
J Section 35(3)(h) and G) 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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Chapter Two: Examination of the Development of Corporate Criminal 
Law in an Environmental Context. 
a) Brief Overview.
In the Republic of South Africa, just like in any other jurisdictions, compames or 
corporations5 occupy a very significant position in our modern society. As a result most, 
if not all, of its activities are constantly under scrutiny either from the governmental 
authorities or non- governmental organisations concerned or responsible with the 
conservation and protection of the environment. This is because most, if not all, of the 
corporations' activities may harm the environment directly or indirectly. By this I refer to 
water pollution, air pollution, land pollution, unlawful waste disposal, the transportation 
of hazardous waste, and the production of chemicals. 
However, with influence from other jurisdictions. most of our environmental statute 
were/ are drafted, implemented and enforced in favour of the 'command and control' 
paradigm. This mearit that criminal law principles were incorporated into our 
environmental statute books. This resulted into the importation of the concept of 
environmental criminal law into our environmental statute books. 
b) Development of the Concept of Corporate Criminal Liability.
At one time it was felt that a company could not be corivicted of a criminal offence 
because. having no mind of its own, it would not have the mens rea or guilty intent 
4 Section 8(4) 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
5 In this entire paper the two words will be used interchangeably. 
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necessary to most crimes6• including and not limited to environmental crimes. However it 
is a fairly well established law today, as it will he discussed in this chapter. that 
corporations can be convicted of a criminal offence of which guilty intent is an essential 
element. 
The above theory developed from an important company law principle that, on its 
formation a company, as a separate entity, acquires the capacity to have its own rights 
and duties7 . The company. therefore, acquires legal personality and exists apart from its 
members8 . This principle was exemplified in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd. 9. The House 
of Lords decided that a company from its inception was legally separate from its 
members 1°. 
Since companies are artificial persons and incapable of unlawful conduct or intention 
attribution of fault to companies has been the central difficulty at common law' 1• As a 
result, approaches to the imposition of criminal liability on companies were developed. 
i) Prima,y Corporate Criminal Liability.
A principal hurdle to the imposition of primary corporate criminal liability at common 
law was that common law offences insisted on proof of criminal fault, and that the courts 6 Yarosky H 'The Criminal Liabilitv of Corporations' (1964) IO McGill Law Journal at 142. 
7 Cilliers HS and Benade ML Corporate Law I 987 at 6. 8 Ibid.9 [ 1897] AC 22. See also Dadoo v Krurzersdorp Municipalitv Council 1920 AD 530.
1° Cilliers and Benade op cit note 7 at 6- 7. 
11 Lipman Z 'Corporations.__Q-jrn_g_ang__the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 72. 
5 
could not see a clear way of saying that a company 'intended' something or 'knew· 
l • 12 somet 1mg 
This hurdle was to some extent overcome in Lennard's Can')'ing Co Ltd v Asiatic 
Petroleum Co Ltd. 13• The court held that a company could be convicted of a criminal 
offence where the requisite fault could be found in a corporate officer who is in effect the 
'directing mind and will' of the company 14. This principle has become to be known as the
'identification theory· or the 'alter ego' theory ofresponsibility. 
The essence of this principle is that some officers of a company are much more than its 
agents or servants. in that their actions can bind the company not upon the basis of 
agency or vicarious liability but because these officers are so close to the 'very ego and 
centre' of the personality of the company that their actions are identified with it 15 • As a 
result, the identified person(s) who acts is not acting for the company but is acting as the 
company. 
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass16, the House of Lords held that the basis of
primary corporate criminal liability was limited to the conduct and fault of the board of 
directors, the managing director. or persons to whom a function of the board had been 
wholly delegated. It may be said that the Tesco case restricted the nature of the 
employees who may be held to act as the company. Because in a situation where a 
12 Goode M 'Cor orate Criminal Liabilitv' in Gunningham et al Environmental Crime 1995 at 97. 13 [1915] AC 705. 
14 Ibid, at 713. 
15 Yarosky op cit note 6 at I 42- 143. 
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company is prosecuted for environmental crirne(s), the Tesco approach has many 
drawbacks, including opportunities for corporate evasion, particularly on the pmt of large 
corporations; and the fact that decisions that cause environmental degradation are often 
not confined to the top levels of management 17 . In short, the Tesco case totally 
misconceives the nature of corporate decision- making 18• 
It may, therefore, be suggested that corporate criminal liability need not be confined to 
only the top management of a corporation, because of the decentralisation of powers 
pmticularly in large corporations. This should also be done with the purpose of 
preventing corporate evasion. 
ii) Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability.
The common law took the position that, generally, there could be no vicarious criminal 
liability, but in the nineteenth century general statutory exceptions to vicarious liability 
led to statutory exceptions to the principle against criminal liability of corporations 1<J_ 
This theory operates by way of an exception to the common law principle (that there 
could be no vicarious criminal liability), and is usually imposed by statute either 
expressly or by necessary implication20• 
16 [1972] AC 153. 
17 Lipman op cit note 11 at.73. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Goode op cit note 12 at 97. 
2<1 Lipman op cit note 11 at 73.
7 
What this theory entails is that a corporation can incur criminal liability as a result of an 
offence by employee. agent or officer acting within the scope of their authority21. In other 
words, this theory rests on the premise that the corporation is an artificial entity that 
cannot and does not act on its own, instead, its agents are seen as acting for the 
corporation. Fisse argue that where vicarious criminal liability is imposed, the offender 
( or the corporation) is held liable not for the offence of his agent or employee but for the 
2� conduct of these people �. 
This is evident from section 332( 1) of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 1977 
which provides that where a corporation is charged with a crime, the fault of the director 
or servant who committed or authorised the crime will be deemed to be that of the 
corporation. It must be noted that this provision extends to conduct as well as to 
intention. Moreover, it seems that the liability imposed is intended to be primary, since 
the actions of the director or servant are deemed to be that of the corporation23 . Hence the 
crucial distinction is that with primary liability the director's intentions are regarded as 
constituting that of the corporation, while vicarious liability involves imputing the 
. 
. f l I . 24 mtent1ons o ot 1ers to t 1e corporation 21 Ibid. 
22 Fisse WB 'The Distinction Between Priman• and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liabilit1·' ( 1967) 41 
Australian Law Journal at 205. 23 Lipman Z 'Corporations, Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 74. 24 Ibid, .at 73. 
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Nevertheless, Bowden and Quigley25 summarizes the criticism of both approaches as 
follows: 
a) Vicarious liability is usually criticised on the ground that it is unjust to impute the
conduct of an agent to the principal, because the corporation might be convicted even
though it was not in any real sense at fault. However, they are not in favour of this
objection and argue that a corporation might evade criminal responsibility if no
particular individual agent can be identified to have been at fault. Particularly in large
and diverse corporate structure, it might well be impossible to pin the fault on any
particular individual; rather, it might be argued that the corporation should be
responsible for the composite conduct of several individuals.
b) A general criticism of primary criminal liability is that while it is perhaps less
derivative than vicarious liability, it is nonetheless a theory that relies upon imputing
fault from individuals to the corporation. It is therefore susceptible to the same
criticisms often advanced against vicarious liability.
As a result, dissatisfaction has been expressed with both the primary and vicarious 
theories of corporate criminal liability because they rest on individual fault instead of 
organisational blameworthiness26. These criticisms led to the development of a theory of
truly primary corporate liability27 . 25 Bowden MA and Quigley T 'Pinstripes or Prison Stripes? rThe Liabilitv o[Corporations and Directors 
[or Environmental Ollences)' 8th international Conference Proceedings, Hong Kong (04 December 1992), 
at 18- 20. 
26 Lipman op cit note 23 at 74. 
27 Ibid. 
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This is a better approach, in my view, because it is based on corporate culture28 . Fisse has 
gone insofar as to advocate a particular statutory form for his theory, which has 
considerable merit29. The basis of his proposal is the idea of organisational 
blameworthiness, that is, that the corporate culture may foster the commission of offences 
even if there is no conscious policy to do so. 
This is a better approach, firstly, because it has the considerable merit of attributing fault 
independently to corporations in recognition that they can and do achieve a life of their 
own apart from their directors, officers, shareholders, and employees30• In other words 
'corporate culture' seems to be more in keeping with the idea that criminal liability 
should be based on fault3 1• Secondly, it also recognises that a corporation is more than the 
sum of individuals it comprises32, in that it is not dependent upon artificial attributions of 
fault having been committed by the same person. 
In 1995 the Federal Government of Australia implemented the Criminal Code Act, which 
provides that a corporation will be taken to have authorised [the contravention] if it had a 
corporate culture, which 'directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to the commission of the 
28 See Fisse and Braithwaite 'The Allocation o(Responsibilitv for Corporate Crime: Individualism, 
Collectivism and Accountabilirv' (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 468; Fisse B 'Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility' (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal 166; Fisse B 'The Attribution o(Liabi/it1· to Corporations: 
A Statutorr Model' (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 277. 29 "The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model", ibid. See also Bowden and 
Quigley op cit note 22 at 23- 24. 30 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 25 at 23. 
31 Lipman op cit note 23 at 75. 32 Ibid. 
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offence' or 'failed to maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the 
relevant provision'33. 
The Code defines 'corporate culture' as: 
' ... An attitude, policy rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body 
corporate generally or within the area of the body corporate in which the relevant 
activities take place' 34. 
Therefore, according to the Act, one of the ways in which corporate fault can be shown is 
by finding the requisite fault in the 'corporate culture' of the corporation35 . 
c) The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Application of the
Principles of Criminal Law to Environmental Crimes. 
There is dissatisfaction in most jurisdictions as to what is perceived to be the failure of a 
system of regulation, based upon a cooperative relationship between regulators and 
polluters36. One response to this concern has been the increase, by politicians and 
legislators in most jurisdictions, of criminal sanctions and the widening of criminal 
offences so that governments are seen to be acting to secure environmentally desirable 
outcomes37• 33 Criminal Code Act 1995, Schedule Pt 2.5 cl l 2.3(2)(b ), ( c ). 34 Cl 12.3(6). 35 Lipman op cit note 31 at 75. 36 Pain N 'Criminal Law and Environment Protection- Overview oflssues and Themes' in Gunningham et 
al Environmental Crime 1995 at 19. 37 Ibid. 
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In the United States of America severe penalties can be awarded under pollution control 
legislation, while the Canadian Environment Protection Act 1987 imposes substantial 
penalties for criminal behaviour against the environment and provides for the 
confiscation of pollution- related profits38• 
South Africa is not an exception, as any contravention of environment legislation is 
described as an offence39• However, Kidd state that environmental criminal law in South 
Africa falls squarely within the 'command and control' paradigm40, but seemingly most 
of our environmental legislation are characterised by a lot of command provisions and 
not much control is carried out. 
The origin of environmental laws stem from the excesses of industrial revolution, the 
growing influence of middle- class "quality of life" values, and the increasing scientific 
understanding of the interdependence of eco- systems 4 1. These developments, however, 
mushroomed together with environmental concerns and problems. 
Therefore, from an environmental law context, the aim of environment law is the 
protection of the environment42. However the protection is not to be understood in an 
absolute sense, but rather as contingent on policy goals, both national and international 
policy goals43. 
38 Ibid. 
39 For example, see Section 34 and Schedule 3 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998. 
4° Kidd M 'Environmental Crime- Time For A Rethink in South Africa' (1998) 5 SAJELP at 191. 
41 Robinson B 'The Nature o(Environmental Crime' in Gunningham et al Environmental Crime 1995 at 9. 
42 Kidd op cit note 40 at 182. 
43 Kidd op cit note 40 at 182- 183. 
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The late 1960's and 70's saw a proliferation of environmental legislation together with 
the development of environmental crimes. The comprehensive nature of most of the 
legislation meant that activities not previously regulated or prohibited were also subjected 
to criminal penalties44• What this meant was that the usage of criminal law in protecting 
the environment had to be justified. 
However, the aims of criminal law are to forbid and prevent unjustifiably and 
inexcusably conduct; and also the punishment of harmful behaviour. As Kidd argues, 
environmental harm can often be substantial harm to the interests of individuals and the 
public at large, so, at first glance, it would appear that criminal law is a justifiable 
weapon to use for the goal of environment protection45• Thus, if criminal sanctions are 
used for the purposes of deterrence, this requires a sufficient threat in order for the 
deterrent to be effective while at the same time ensuring that the seriousness of the threat 
corresponds with the seriousness of the harm sought to be prevented46• So, if relatively 
minor offences are punished by heavy penalties, this will lead to disrespect of the law, 
especially in a society like ours where there is a perception that 'real' criminals are either 
avoiding arrest and prosecution altogether, or that they are being treated leniently by our 
legal system47• 
44 Robinson op cit note 41 at 10. 
45 Kidd op cit note 40 at 183. 
46 Kidd op cit note 40 at 185. 
47 Ibid. 
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It is within this context that the advantages and disadvantages of the application of 
criminal law to environmental crimes are now discussed. As Pain states, there are certain 
inherent problems with the use of criminal law to achieve environmental outcomes that 
are caused by a conflict between the natures of criminal law as it currently stands, and the 
idea and ideals of environmental protection 48•
Advantages and Disadvantages of Criminal Law. 
Firstly, if corporations are to be viewed as (mostly) rational value maximising entities, 
criminal sanctions that attach to values such as profit, prestige and stability are likely to 
have more of a deterrent effect than those that are largely irrelevant to the corporations 
except as another 'cost of doing business'49. Punishments such as court- ordered adverse 
publicity, community service, and stock dilution through equity fines should be 
considered as new criminal sanctions. 
Secondly, as Lazarus suggests, absent the possibility of criminal sanctions, particularly 
those directed at individuals, corporations might view sanctions for environmental laws 
as mere costs of doing business50. Corporate probation orders and punitive injunctions 
against criminally liable corporations might go a long way in actively changing corporate 
behaviour. 
48 Pain N 'Criminal Law and Environmental Protection- Overview oUssues & Themes' in Gunningham et 
al Environmental Crime 1995 at 21. 
49 Ibid, at 26. 
50 Lazarus RJ 'Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with 
Environmental Crime· (1994) 27 Loyoia LA Law Review at 880. 
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And lastly, criminal law is the only process that can be used to impose severe penalties 
on offenders. In fact, it is through the criminal process that fines and imprisonment can 
be imposed. 
The flip- side of the coin is that criminal law is not without disadvantages. Professor 
Kidd51 summarises the weaknesses as follows: 
► Not Preventative by Nature: The criminal law is not immediately preventative by
nature. It is designed to react to an offence that has already been committed, which
might often be too late to prevent damage to the environment. It does not, therefore,
prevent the occurrence of environmental harm, which should be the fundamental
basis of environmental protection regimes.
► Costs Involved in Criminal Prosecutions: Disputes are settled in court, which takes up
time and resources and may well delay the remediation of the harm for which liability
is being debated. Because of the need to use expert evidence in some of the pollution
trials, costs are higher than the frequently encountered common- law crimes. These
costs may be more valuably directed towards upgrading harmful processes or
remediating damage.
► Standard of Proof: The proof required in the commission of an offence, which is
beyond reasonable doubt, is considerably more difficult than the balance of
probabilities required in civil actions. This, it is submitted, is a universal problem.
► Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial52 : Juristic persons are entitled to the guarantees in
the Bill of Rights 'to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of
51 Kidd M 'Environmental Crime- Time For A Rethink in South Africa' (I 998) 5 SAJELP at 188- 191. 
52 Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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that juristic person'53. The courts, in considering these rights, have consistently 
insisted on their importance thereby suggesting that any limitation of these rights 
would have to be justified very strongly indeed54. It is doubtful whether the reverse­
onus provisions in our environmental legislation will survive the constitutional 
muster55 . 
► Inadequate Policing: The shortage of inspectors and similar officials to monitor
compliance with the law and to apprehend offenders is another contributing factor in
one of the failures of criminal law. The administration of a number of environmental
statutes has been assigned to provinces that are spending most of their budgets on
matters that are seen as more pressing namely education, health, and welfare.
Unfortunately, as Farrier says, 'successful deterrence depends not only upon severity
of punishment but also on a perceived high risk of detection' 56• This, however, is not
an inherent weakness in the use of the criminal law but rather a de facto shortcoming.
► Lack of Public Awareness: People who are aware that a certain conduct is wrong and
prohibited by law may well assist officials by bringing those offenders to their notice.
However the lack of public awareness of threats to the environment is often impeded
by lack of information. This is exacerbated by the fact that many South African
citizens attitudes towards even those offences which in most countries would be
regarded as morally wrong as well as illegal, may well have been deadened by the53 Section 8(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 54 See, O' Regan J in S v Bhulwana. S v Gwadiso 1996 (]) SA 388 CC at para. 24: '(the presumption of 
innocence) is a pillar of our system of criminal justice'. 55 See, S v Bhulwana (supra). S v Coetzee and others 1997 (4) BCLR 437 CC. For a presumption in 
environmental legislation, which was struck down, see Sv Mumbe 1997 (]) SA 854 (WJ. 56 Farrier D 'In Search of Real Criminal Law' in Tim Bonyhady (ed.) Environmental Protection and Legal 
Change 1992 at 86. 
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widespread concern over rampant 'ordinary' criminal activities which most people 
regard as more serious than environmental offences. 
► Lack of Expertise of Court Officials: Many prosecutors m our country are
inexperienced when it comes to environmental law. In fact, most of them have no
substantial background of environmental law. As a result, as environmental
prosecutions are few and far between, there is no expertise in prosecuting these
offences, which often require proof of difficult scientific facts. It is, moreover,
difficult to escape the conclusion that, even where such cases are completely
prosecuted, magistrates may sometimes be intimidated by the intricacies of the
scientific evidence into requiring proof beyond any doubt rather than reasonable
doubt.
► Inadequate Penalties: As Loots argues much of the criticism of criminal enforcement
of environmental law in our country is leveled at the inadequate penalties provided
for by legislation57 . The penalties provided for in legislation must be sufficiently
serious to deter. Because the public has to see these penalties being utilised since
ultimately, one cannot fear what turns out to be a paper threat58 .
Now given these drawbacks, there has been much discussion about whether civil law 
processes may be more effective and appropriate in dealing with environmental crimes. It 
57 Loots C 'Making Environmental law E[(ective' (1994) I SAJELP at 18. 
58 Farrier op cit note 56 at 86. 
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is; therefore, worth noting that section 30(9) of the National Environmental Management 
Act 1998 does provide for civil liability when it comes to environmental degradation59. 
But it is better, in my view, to have a mixture of civil and criminal processes in our 
environmental legislation. As Kidd argues, criminal liability should be reserved for 
serious offences only where fault would generally be present and possible to prove on the 
facts60• Civil law would, therefore, regulate most aspects of environmental regulation, 
while criminal law operating outside of and in support of the civil law. This approach 
would provide a more coherent building of a moral imperative in favour of environmental 
protection by focusing on this goal through the criminal law, while more appropriately 
and effectively regulating polluting behaviour in the short term through the civil law61 • 
Chapter Three: Corporations or Companies. 
a) Development of the Concept of Corporate Environmental Crimes.
The twentieth century witnessed tremendous explosion in the number and size of 
corporations, to the point that their activities are now under scrutiny. In view of the 
immense power exercised by them, there is a general recognition of the necessity for 
corporations to be subjected to criminal law62. As Lipman notes, that practical difficulties 
59 The section provides that 'a relevant authority may claim reimbursement of all reasonable costs incurred 
by it in terms of subsection (8) from every responsible person jointly and severally'. It is argued that this 
section also covers corporations that have caused harm to the environment. 
6° Kidd M 'Environmental Crime- Time For A Rethink in South Africa?' (1998) 5 SAJELP at 200. 
61 Pain N 'Criminal Law and Environment Protection- Overview ofissues and Themes' in Gunningham et 
al Environmental Crime 1995 at 28- 9. 
62 Lipman Z 'Corporations. Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 69. This view was also 
expressed in R v Canadian Dredge & Dock Co Ltd. /1985 I 1 SCR 662, at 692, the court stated that ' ... the 
corporate vehicle now occupies such a large portion of the industrial, commercial, and sociological sectors 
that amenability of the corporation to our criminal law is as essential in the case of the corporation as in the 
case of a natural person'. 
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in applying the traditional principles of criminal law to environmental crimes led to the 
reform of the common law, in an attempt to mould it to the requirements of corporate 
environmental crimes63 . 
Historically, wrongful activities of corporations were distinguished from those of 
individual criminals64 • For example: an individual defendant's mental state with which he 
or she committed an illegal act determines his moral culpability, but mental state has no 
meaning when it applied to a corporate defendant since a corporation possess no mental 
state 65.
But where company's activities causes environmental degradation, the application of 
criminal law, as stated in chapter one, becomes problematic as the activities complained 
of might be very close to legitimate business practices making it difficult to regard such 
offences as true crimes66 • These types of crimes are referred to as 'white- collar crimes'. 
Reasons draws a distinction between 'white- collar crimes that are committed by 
individuals against corporations for personal gains and 'corporate crimes' that are 
committed by corporations as organisations67. It is in these latter crimes that the 
traditional general principles of criminal law fall short. 63 Ibid. 
64 Lipman op cit note 62 at 70.
65 Anonymous 'Develooments in the Law- Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through 
Criminal Sanctions ' ( 1997) 92 Harvard Law Review at 1241. 66 Lipman op cit note 62 at 71. 
67 Reasons C 'Crimes Against the Environment: Some Theoretical and Practical Concerns' ( 1991) 34
Criminal Law Quarterly at 88. 
19 
As a result, in most countries, environmental cnmes were regarded as being purely 
regulatory in nature. Hence, for example, pollution in most jurisdictions (including South 
Africa) is not illegal, but is regulated by way of issuing licences, certificates or permits. 
Most countries regulate the corporations' activities by way of regulatory schemes. 
Regulatory offences are generally punishable without proof of fault but the penalties are 
low and imprisonment not an option 68.
Unfortunately, by mid- 1980's it was evident that the existing approach was not effective: 
the slip between the environmental degradation cup and the regulatory protection lip was 
obvious69• This was because of the changing nature of environmental problems70. In 
addition, the regulatory schemes that had been applied in a decidedly subjective manner
failed to consider the broader implications of less than rigorous implementation in
exacerbating macro- environmental problems such as ozone depletion, climate change
and soil depletion71• Furthermore, there has been growing recognition that environmental
crimes do not always conform to the regulatory schemes because of the wider dangers
that they may pose to the environment and that differential treatment is required for
different types of environmental offences 72.
Consequently the continued degradation of our planet and environment forced 
reconsideration of the approach to environmental protection, via the reform of 
environmental legislation and the re- tooling of practices associated with existing 68 Lipman op cit note 62 at 71. 69 Bowden MA and Quigley T 'Pinstripes or Prison Stripes? (The Liabilitr Of Corporations and Directors 
for Environmental Offences) 8th International Conference, Hong Kong (04 December 1992) at 9. 
70 Ibid. 
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regulatory schemes 73. The regulatory approach remained, but those charged with
bureaucratic responsibility for the environment seemed more willing to aggressively 
enforce the legislation and to introduce the necessary measures to meet environmental 
goals 74. 
The province of Ontario in Canada, 1986, through the Environmental Enforcement Law 
Amendment Act75 substantially increased penalties for environmental offences 
committed under the Environmental Protection Act76, the Ontario Water Resources Act 77, 
and the Pesticides Act78 and also differentiated the level of fines as between individuals 
and corporate offenders. In addition, the Act established a hierarchy of offences based on 
the severity of the offence, separated corporate environmental liability from the liability 
of directors and officers, and introduced the possibility of jail sentences upon conviction 
of these individuals 79•
In Australia, the New South Wales Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 was 
enacted as a separate legislation imposing high penalties and imprisonment for serious 
environmental crimes. This Act is an amalgam of criminal and regulatory approaches to 
environmental crimes within the same statute80. Under this Act, penalties for corporate 
offenders are higher than those for individuals, this recognises the fact that corporations 71 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 69 at 9- 10. 72 Lipman op cit note 68 at 71.
73 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 69 at I 0. 74 Ibid. 75 Environmental Enforcement Law Amendment Act. S. 0. 1986. c. 68. 76 Environmental Protection Act. R.S.O. 1980, c. 141. 77 Ontario Water Resources Act. R.S.O. 1980, c 361. 78 Pesticides Act, R.S.0. 1980. c 376. 79 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 69 at 10- 11. 21 
generally are potentially the major sources of environmental degradation and that they 
have greater resources than individuals81 .
In South Africa, Chapter 16 of the National Water Act provides for offences and 
remedies but does not stipulate the amount of the fines in cases of freshwater pollution. 
The court may enquire into the harm or loss suffered or into the damage caused to water 
resource and makes an award of damages accordingly against the offender82• While the 
National Environmental Management Act state that where any person is convicted of an 
offence under any statute listed in Schedule 3 of the Act, the court may enquire into the 
amount ofloss or damage caused83 •
It is clear from the above illustrations that environmental legislation, in most 
jurisdictions, are changing from regulatory approaches to a more mixed approach where 
the velvet glove of a compliance approach is backed with the iron fist of sanctioning. And 
provisions that address corporate and executive environmental liability often share 
common characteristics, because, in many countries, the upper limits of fines for 
corporations convicted of environmental offences are higher than those set for individual 
non- corporate offenders84•80 Lipman Z 'Corporations. Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 72. 81 Ibid. 
82 Sections 152 and 153 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 83 Section 34( 1 )- (7) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 84 Bowden MA and Quigley T 'Pinstripes or Prison Stripes? (The LiabiliD' of Corporations and Directors 
for Environmental O/Tences)' 8th International Conference, Hong Kong (04 December 1992) at 12. 
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b) The Need for Corporate Environmental Crimes.
Notwithstanding the slow evolution of corporate environmental crimes, modem society's 
activities dictate the necessity to have corporate environmental crimes. This may be due 
to the fact that, in the past, there were relatively few corporations, but the increase in 
number and size of corporations and the ever-increasing difficulty of precisely 
ascertaining the responsible employee of the corporation necessitate change85 •
In addition, given the corporations position in our modem society, they are regarded as 
being responsible for most pollutants released into the environment. In other words, while 
it is recognised that damage to the environment emanates from varied sources, it is 
equally beyond doubt that the more serious cases of damage to the environment are 
caused by corporations86. Thus, it is clear that the key to environmental protection is 
effective control over the environmental activities of corporations87 .
Moreover, it is a requirement of justice that everyone who breaches a penal law be 
subjected to prosecution. It is hardly fair that individuals committing rather petty crimes, 
almost always entailing only one or few victims, are subject to prosecution and 
imprisonment while a company causing harm on a far greater scale, yet escape 
punishment88. Consider this example of a spill of effluent from a pipeline operated by a 
mining company. While admitting that criminal prosecution is not the only approach, in 
85 Okon EE 'Corporate Criminal Liabilitr Under Nigerian Environmental Law' (1993) 9 Lesotho Law 
Journal at 175. 
86 lbid, at 171- 2. 
87 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 84 at 15. 
88 Fisse B 'Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions' (1983) 
56 Southern California Law Review at 1150- 52. 
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these circumstances where, if the mine is located in a remote area so as not to cause 
damage to any particular individual or if the effects are so indeterminate as to make 
tortious liability difficult to establish, prosecution of the corporation for an environmental 
offence seems entirely appropriate and just. 
Furthermore as corporations usually enjoy a wider array of resources, information, and 
expertise, they are better equipped to take measures to avoid the commission of criminal 
offences than are individuals89. Thus when the cause of environmental crime is motivated 
either by profit or avoidance of economic loss, criminal prosecution is appropriate and 
just90 . In such circumstances, it is not unfair to encourage the corporation to avoid any 
environmental degradation on pain of criminal prosecution if they fail to do so. 
The fourth argument is to look at the nature of the harm. The greater the risk to public 
health and safety, the greater the opportunities of criminal prosecution. In our country, 
section 24 of the Final Constitution guarantees every citizen an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being. It follows that any corporation acting contrary to 
this section can be subject to punishment, in terms of environmental legislation91 . 
Lastly, Bowden and Quigley92 summarise a number of other reasons why corporations 
should bear legal responsibility for environmental crimes: 
(a) Corporations are major sources of environmental degradation;
89 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 84 at 15. 
9° Corporate Board 'Corporate Environmental Criminal Liabilin · is Expanding ' (Sep/ Oct 1994) Vol. 15 
Issue 88 at 28. http://ehostvgw2.epnet.com/de1iverv.asp 
91 For more details, see Glazewski J Environmental Law in South Africa 2000 at 85- 88. 
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(b) Larger corporations commit a disproportionate number of violations;
(c) Corporations (as opposed to individuals) handle the most dangerous types of
pollutants;
( d) Corporations have the resources to reduce degradation, resources accumulated in part
through untrammelled use of common resources;
(e) Degradation by corporations tends to be concentrated in location and, arguably, in
volume and is thus more likely to substantially harm the eco-system;
(f) The localization and scale of pollution by corporations typically make it easier to
address than corresponding volumes of pollution produced by individuals.
Clearly the mere fact that corporate bodies conduct a major part of all economic 
endeavour should lead to the realisation that criminal prosecution for environmental 
crimes must be a part of the arsenal deployed to protect the environment93 . Therefore, 
from an environmental context, the concept of corporate liability for environmental 
crimes is a sound one. 
92 Bowden and Quigley op cit note 89 at 15. 93 Ibid. 
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Part II- Evidentiary Problems: the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination. 
Chapter Four: The Nature of the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination 
and Current State of the Law in South Africa. 
a) Introduction.
Waste products from industrial societies are entering the environment at a rate far greater 
than the rate of natural absorption, and much of the waste are in the form of substances 
which are either toxic to the environment or human health94 • Hence the regulatory 
framework that controls a company's environmental activities is complex, and the civil or 
criminal liabilities that may be imposed for breaches of such laws are troublesome and 
burdensome95 • 
In addition, the focus on corporate accountability for environmental degradation is 
prompting companies to adopt a proactive approach to environmental management96. 
Central to this approach is the growing use of internal environmental audits to detect or 
prevent potential breaches of environmental laws and regulations97. Moreover, the very 
existence of the audit document could itself be incriminating if a breach occurs later, as it 
may provide evidence that the corporation had knowledge of the circumstances 
surrounding the later breach98 . 94 Goldblatt M 'Registering Pollution: the prospects [or a pollution information svstem' in Bethlehem and 
Goldblatt (editors) The Bottom-Line: Industry and the Environment in South Africa 1997 at 120. 95 McDonald J 'Confidentialitv o(Environmental Audit Documents' in Gunningham et al Environmental 
Crime 1995 at 203. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 
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As a result, the results of such audits attracts two fundamental rights, namely, the right of 
access to environmental information99 and the right not to be compelled to give self­
incriminating evidence 100 (in situations where the state institute criminal prosecution 
against an offending corporation). Firstly, whether the latter right should be extended to 
corporations in environmental criminal prosecutions, is examined thereafter a discussion 
on the right of access to environmental information will follow. 
b) What is the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?
"As the common law developed, the rights of the individual were extended which, in 
many cases, made it increasingly more difficult to obtain evidence of wrong doing. Like 
other offenders, in most jurisdictions, corporations are afforded natural justice, the 
presumption of innocence and other protections. However given their powerful position 
that they hold in our modem society and their capacity for polluting the environment, the 
privilege against self- incrimination works greatly to the advantage of corporations and 
also hinder enforcement of environmental legislation" 101.
In essence: what is this privilege against sel(- incrimination? Bearing in mind that, at 
least, from a South Africa perspective it is inextricably linked with the right to remain 
silent102 . 99 Section 32(2) of the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act l 08 of 1996. 
100 Section 35(3)G) of the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act I 08 of 1996. 
101 Lipman Z 'Corporations. Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 82. 
102 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 35(3)0) read with section 35(3)(h) protects 
the corporate offenders right to remain silent when facing a criminal prosecution. 
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"The phrase privilege against self- incrimination is sometimes used to mean any rule or 
aspiration facilitating silence. At other times it refers to the modern right to remain silent. 
It guarantees that no person can be required to answer a question tending to expose him 
to a criminal prosecution and also that a criminal defendant may refuse to testify 
altogether. This right is a strong one, in that any statement acquired in violation of the 
privilege is inadmissible at trial, and any evidence discovered because of such a statement 
is inadmissible generally" 103• This privilege is basically two fold, in that, it protects not
only against evidence that may lead to criminal conviction, but also against information 
that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to criminal 
prosecution 104•
Corporations ' right to remain silent basically provides that corporations are not obliged 
to assist the State to prove or disprove their guilt 105 . This right basically means that
corporations are not obliged, in any way, to assist the State in its environmental criminal 
investigation against the corporation. Accordingly, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
any pre- trial compulsion that focuses on corporations to produce environmental audit 
documents and answer questions, violates or at least compromises corporation's right to 
remain silent106.
103 Smith HE 'The Modern Privilege: its Nineteenth- Centurv Origins' in Helmholz et al The Privilege 
Against Self- Incrimination: its Origins and Development 1997 at 145. 
104 Carr DA Environmental Criminal Liabilia-: Avoiding and Defending Enforcement Actions 1995 at 89. 
105 Bruce D, Savage K, and De Waal J 'A Durv to Answer Questions? The Police. the Independent 
Complaints Directorate and the Right to Remain Silent' (2000) 16 SAJHR at 83. Italics own emphasis. 
106 Ibid. ltalics own emphasis. 
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From a South African environmental context, the Republic's environmental authorities 107
are 'organs of the state' 108 and as such are bound, in terms of section 8(1) of the 1996 
Constitution, by all provisions of the Bill of Rights 1°9.
As many corporations, in the Republic, conduct their own voluntary environmental 
auditing the purpose of which being to identify and remedy operational problems and 
environmental harm at an early stage, the problem arises where such audit documents 
reveal a past or present breach of an environmental statute or permit, which, in turn, may 
give rise to criminal or civil liability110. It is clear that the audit documents can provide 
evidence that the corporation had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the 
breach 111, and consequently environment degradation. Not forgetting the fact that those 
documents can, in most cases, also be incriminating to both the corporation and its 
corporate officers. 
On the flip- side of the coin exist two opposing interests, namely, the State wanting to 
discover the audit documents for the sole purpose of wanting to institute environmental 
criminal prosecution against the corporate offender, and the corporation demanding 
confidentiality for their voluntary audit documents. Corporations usually claim 
confidentiality by invoking the privilege against self- incrimination. 107 For example, the Chief Air Pollution Control Officer and the inspectors appointed in terms of the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of I 965; Department of Water Affairs, Catchment Management 
Agencies established in terms of the National Water Act 36 of 1998; and the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism as instituted by the National Environmental Management Act I 07 of I 998. 108 In terms of section 239 of the Constitution, any functionary or institution that exercises a public power 
or perform a public function in terms of any legislation is an organ of state. 109 Bruce, Savage and De Waal op cit note 205 at 81. 110 McDonald J 'Confidentialitv a/Environmental Audit Documents' in Gunningham et al Environmental 
Crime I 995 at 203. 
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How this works is that corporations (as non- accused corporate offenders) avail 
themselves of the privilege to prevent, firstly, the State from discovering the audit 
documents in bolstering their case against the corporation, and secondly prevent the 
introduction of the audit documents as evidence at a criminal trial (where such a breach 
may result in criminal prosecution)112• The environmental authorities, in terms of the 
privilege, are not allowed to discover the audit documents from the corporations and also 
are prevented from using such documents in a criminal prosecution against the 
corporation. 
Therefore, one may argue that environmental authorities are allowed to discover and 
peruse such documents, if its only purpose is to see how the corporation uses the audit 
information in environmental protection. Here the purpose for discovery is legitimate as 
the authorities are not searching for any statutory breaches or permit breaches. But the 
situation changes when the authorities, after perusal of the documents discovers a 
statutory or permit breach, decides to institute criminal prosecution against the 
corporation for the alleged breach. The corporation may use the privilege to claim back 
the audit documents from the environmental authorities. Then if the environmental 
authority refuses, there is violation of the corporate offenders' privilege against self­
incrimination. If the environmental authority proceeds with its criminal prosecution 
against the corporate offender, the latter can also claim the privilege in that criminal 
proceeding. This is because section 35(3)0) of our Final Constitution precludes evidence 
Ill Ibid. 
112 De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G The Bill o[Rights Handbook 4th Edition 2001 at 644.
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How this works is that corporations (as non- accused corporate offenders) avail 
themselves of the privilege to prevent, firstly, the State from discovering the audit 
documents in bolstering their case against the corporation, and secondly prevent the 
introduction of the audit documents as evidence at a criminal trial (where such a breach 
may result in criminal prosecution) 112• The environmental authorities, in terms of the 
privilege, are not allowed to discover the audit documents from the corporations and also 
are prevented from using such documents in a criminal prosecution against the 
corporation. 
Therefore, one may argue that environmental authorities are allowed to discover and 
peruse such documents, if its only purpose is to see how the corporation uses the audit 
information in environmental protection. Here the purpose for discovery is legitimate as 
the authorities are not searching for any statutory breaches or permit breaches. But the 
situation changes when the authorities, after perusal of the documents discovers a 
statutory or permit breach, decides to institute criminal prosecution against the 
corporation for the alleged breach. The corporation may use the privilege to claim back 
the audit documents from the environmental authorities. Then if the environmental 
authority refuses, there is violation of the corporate offenders' privilege against self­
incrimination. If the environmental authority proceeds with its criminal prosecution 
against the corporate offender, the latter can also claim the privilege in that criminal 
proceeding. This is because section 35(3)(j) of our Final Constitution precludes evidence 
111 Ibid. 
112 De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G The Bill o(Rights Handbook 4th Edition 200 I at 644.
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directly obtained from voluntary disclosure from use in subsequent criminal proceedings; 
11 d d • • 'd , I I 1 so- ca e ' envativc ev1 encc ·. 
The right to remain silent, which does not oblige the corporation to assist the state to 
prove or disprove the corporation's guilt, further supports this 114• As the audit documents 
can assist the State in proving its case against the corporation for the alleged breach and 
environmental degradation, it is the corporation's right to invoke the privilege against 
self- incrimination. 
Moreover, it is the duty of the State to prove the guilt of the corporation without any 
assistance from the corporate offender, so, it is arguable, that the use of such documents 
as evidence against the corporate offender in a subsequent criminal prosecution, preceded 
by a voluntary disclosure to the environmental authorities of the audit documents, 
compromises both the corporation's privilege against self- incrimination and the right to 
remain silent 115 •
Thus in Ferreira v Levin NO Ackermann J116 expressed, the view with which the majority 
of the court appeared to agree 117, that the trial judge in a subsequent trial is best placed to 
decide on the admissibility of derivative evidence. Ultimately, Ackermann J held, the 
113 Bruce D, Savage Kand De Waal J 'A Dun• to Answer Ouestions? The Police. the Independent 
Complaints Directorate and the Righi lo Remain Silent' (2000) 16 SAJHR at 82. 'Derivative evidence' is 
evidence obtained as a result of the disclosure made during the inquiry, may, in principle, be used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. In Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 ICC) at para I 53, Ackermann J 
expressed the view that the presiding officer in the subsequent trial is best placed to decide on the 
admissibility of derivative evidence. 
114 Ibid, at 83. 
115 Section 35(3)(j) read with section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
116 1996 (I) SA 984 (CC) at para 153. 
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trial judge must ensure a fair trial and decide whether the admission of derivative 
evidence would undermine the Constitution ·s commitment to a fair trial on the facts of 
the case before him or her. 
The Constitutional Court decision in this regard makes the internal audit documents of 
the corporation voluntarily discovered admissible, in principle, unless the use of such 
audits would make the trial unfair 118•
The constitutional right against self- incrimination in our country is therefore nothing but 
a use- immunity, meaning that self- incriminating evidence may not be used against the 
corporation, either, when wanting to institute environmental criminal prosecution for 
alleged breach of permit or statute discovered from the voluntary disclosure by the 
corporation of its audits, or when wanting to use such audits as evidence in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding 119• The reason is that. while non- accused persons do not have the 
right against self- incrimination, they may invoke the privilege to prevent the introduction 
of the evidence at a criminal trial 120. 
As a result, State power in taking action or prosecuting corporation for environmental 
crimes is hindered, if not limited. In addition, the State power in enforcing environmental 
legislation is to some extent limited. Because, although the corporation's internal 
environmental auditing has revealed breaches the State enforcement actions against the 
117 The majority of the court (at para 187) appears to agree with Ackermann J's view. 
118 Bruce, Savage and De Waal op cit note 113 at 82. 
119 De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G The Bill o[Rights Handbouk 4'" Edition 200 I at 644. 
120 Ibid. 
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corporation are limited. For example the State may only force the corporation to pay a 
fine for failing to comply with the permit or statute. Such a fine the corporation can 
absorb as a "mere cost of doing business". The privilege against self- incrimination does 
not only prevent the State from ensuring that corporations do in fact comply with 
environmental statutes or permits, but also that corporations protect the environment in 
their activities. 
Magner sets out other criticisms levelled against this privilege I2I : 
► Firstly, that the privilege is fundamentally a human right. In its origin together with
its continuing justification, it is a central fact that the privilege prevents torture and
other abuses of human rights. It was first recognised as a human right in the High
Court by Murphy J in Rochthrt v Trade Practices Commission where his Honour said,
"the privilege against self- incrimination is a human right based on the desire to
protect personal freedom and human dignity" I22. It, therefore, follows that
corporations are, in deed, not and cannot be subjected to threats of such treatment. In
addition, the privilege has developed against the backdrop of increasing statutory
denial of the privilege to corporations 123 ;
► Secondly, that the privilege is against testimonial incrimination. This has been
interpreted to mean that the privilege exists to protect the individual from self­
disclosure either orally or in writing. Documents can be seen to fall into two
categories, narrative accounts and operative instruments. Those documents that
121 Magner ES 'Case and Comment: Ca/lex Relining Co. Pry ltd. v State Pollution Control Commission' 
(1992) 16 Crim.LJ at 121. 
122 (1982) 153 CLR 134 at 150. 
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contain narrative accounts of events and might contain admissions would clearly 
serve a testimonial function and the view that those should be protected is clearly 
acceptable. But those that are operative instruments (like environmental audit 
documents), business documents, instructions, receipts, invoices and the likes do not 
serve a testimonial function and could be seen to be more analogous to real evidence; 
and 
► Lastly, in Caltex Refining Co. Pti• Ltd. v State Pollution Control Commission12./ the
Court of Criminal Appeal highlighted that the privilege served three main purposes:
First, it is an aspect of individual privacy and dignity ... [second] it assists to hold a
proper balance between the powers of the State and the rights and interests of
citizens ... [ and, third] it is a significant element maintaining the integrity of the
accusatorial system of criminal justice, which obliges the Crown to make out a case
before the accused must answer 125 .
Inextricably linked with the problem of the privilege against self- incrimination, is 
whether corporate officers retain a personal right to the privilege when required to 
produce the audit documents on behalf of the corporation that could incriminate them 
personally. Although the Caltex decision has important implications for corporate 
officers, the court, however, left this question open 126. 123 Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Reali)' Have a Right to Silence Since Caltex and Abbco 
lceworks? (1996) 13 EPLJ at 365. 124 (1991) 74 LORA 46. 125 Ibid, at 53. 126 Lipman z. 'Old Wine in New Bottles: Difficulties in the Avplication al General Principles of Criminal 
Law to Environmental Law' in Gunningham et al Environmental Crime 1995 at 85. 
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 127 Cilliers HS and Benade ML Entrepreneurial Law 2nd Edition 2000 at 69. 128 Ibid. 129 Cilliers and Benade op cit note 127 at 69-70. 130 Puls J 'Corporate Privilege-Do Directors Real/11 Have a Right to Silence Since Caltex and Abbco lceworks?' (1996) I 3 EPLJ at 364. 'Corporate Officers' in this context, refers to company boards, directors and managers, but more generally to anyone who can be held personally liable for the activities of the company by which they are employed or of which they are a director. 131 Ibid. For example, see sections 50(3), 172 and 424 of the South African Companies Act 61 of I 973; also see Daimler Co. Ltd v Continental T)ire and Rubber Co. {/9167 2 AC 307, Robinson v Rand[ontein Estates Gold Mining Co. ltd 1921 AD 168 [at I 94-195], The Shipping Corporation o[/ndia Ltd. v Evdomon Cornoration 1994 (I) SA 550 (AJ, and the Cape Pacific ltd. v Lubner Controlling Investments (P{)I) ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) for the "lifting or piercing of the corporate veil" by the courts. 132 Puls op cit note 130 at 364. m Puls op cit.note 130 at 366. 35 ' 
One of the most significant areas in which corporate officers are now personally liable for 
the actions of their company is in environmental law 134. It appears, at least from a South
African context, that the privilege might be available to corporate officers. Because the 
privilege against self- incrimination only precludes incriminating evidence obtained from 
one person from being used against the same person in subsequent criminal 
prosecution 135• What this means is evidence (or audit records) if obtained from the
corporate officer that incriminates the corporation as a legal person, may be used against 
the corporation in the alleged breach of legislation. 
Therefore, it can be said that corporate officers are only allowed to invoke the privilege 
where such records (or evidence). arc in fact incriminating the corporate officer into the 
alleged environmental crime. In essence, the records or 'incriminating' evidence must 
establish the guilt of the corporate officer concerned. It also goes without saying that the 
'incriminating' evidence must be obtainable from the corporate officer concerned. 
However, a situation may arise where the audit records incriminate both the corporation 
and its corporate officers. This is inevitable as corporate officers, in most cases, are 
acting on behalf or for the corporation. This may be a difficult problem to prevent, 
particularly in large corporations, where decisions that lead to environmental degradation 
are often not confined to the top levels of management 136. 
134 Puls op cit note I 30 at 367. 
135 Bruce D. Savage Kand De Waal J 'A Duti· to Answer Questions? The Police. the Independent 
Complaints Directorate and the Right to Remain Silent' (2000) 16 SAJH R at 81. 
136 Lipman Z 'Corporations. Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 73. 
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c) The Current State of the Law in South Africa.
In South Africa, the Bill of Rights in our Final Constitution guarantees everyone the right 
'not to be compelled to give self- incrimination evidence· 137• Arguably, this guarantee 
should only be available to natural persons and not to juristic persons or corporations 1 38. 
Of course, this will depend on a lot of issues, notably the extent to which the guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights are interpreted as applicable to corporations 139. This is evidenced by
a section in our Final Constitution. which provides that a juristic person is entitled to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature 
of that juristic person 140. In fact, the word "person" in the Bill of Rights is given its wider 
meaning as it is not limited to natural person(s) but also includes juristic person(s). 
This means that corporations are guaranteed the right to a fair trial, section 35(3) Act 108 
of 1996, which includes but is not limited to the privilege against self- incrimination I41
and the right to remain silent I42 . These rights, in turn, hamper the enforcement of
environmental legislation. In fact these rights pose an evidential problem, which will be 
discussed in detail below. 
137 Lipman Z 'Corporation, Crime and the Environment' 1997 4 (SAJELP) at 86. Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996, section 35(3)(j). 
138 Ibid. 
13
9 Ibid.
14° Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 8(4). 
141 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 35(3)(i). 
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This is a problem from a South African Environmental perspective, because: 
, Firstly, no South African cou11 has decided on the constitutional application of the 
privilege against self- incrimination to corporations 143; and 
► Secondly, no legislation has been introduced which removes the privilege with
• 144respect to corporations
The question that needs to be clarified is: how is this privilege an evidential problem ilt 
potential environmental criminal prosecutions? 
The growing trend of corporate accountability for environmental degradation prompted 
companies to adopt a voluntary proactive approach to environmental management 145• 
This approach entails the growing use of internal environmental audits to detect and 
prevent potential breaches of environmental laws and regulations 146• But most
importantly to protect the environment against the degrading activities of corporations/ 
compames. 
The existence of the audit documents could itself be incriminating if a breach occurs, as it 
may provide evidence that the company had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 
the breach 147. Thus corporations' concern is whether this information can remain
142 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 35(3)(h). 
143 Lipman op cit note 137 at 86. 
144 Ibid. 
145 McDonald J 'Confidentialit1· o[Environmental Audit Documents' in Gunningharn et al Environmental 
Crime 1995 at 203. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
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confidential, as the State and even civil action subject the environment to numerous 
I . b I f' I . I I d . . I . 148 A I regu ahons, a reac 1 o w uc 1 may ea to crnmna prosecution . s a resu t 
corporations, in most jurisdictions, when faced with the discovery of the audit 
documents, in a criminal prosecution, they invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
Consequently, in South Africa, the State will encounter significant evidential difficulties 
in obtaining corporation's environmental audit records 149• Because the most obvious way 
in which corporations might seek to protect its records from discovery by the State is to 
claim the privilege against seif- incrimination 150.
Kidd correctly states that environmental criminal law in South Africa falls squarely 
within the 'command and control paradigm' ... with any contravention of the legislation 
declared to be an offence ... 151• The fact that the government does not have the resources
to conduct its own monitoring and is largely reliant on environmental audits by 
corporations will be to their disadvantage 152. If the corporations' environmental records 
cannot be discovered in criminal prosecutions, it will be extremely difficult for the State 
to prove its case 153 • This would, in turn, lead to lax approach in dealing with corporate
offenders in cases of environmental degradation and breaches of legislation. 
148 Spedding L, Jones D and Dering C Eco- Management and Eco-Auditing: Environmental Issues in 
Business 1994 at 185.
149 Lipman Z 'Old Wine in New Boll/es: Diljiculties in the Am;lication o[General Princivles of Criminal 
law lo Environmental law' in Gunningham et al Environmental Crime 1995 at 40.
150 McDonald J 'Confidentialit)' o(Environmental Audit Documents' in Gunningham et al Environmental 
Crime 1995 at 204.
151 Kidd M 'Environmental Crime- Time For A Rethink in South Africa?' ( 1998) 5 SAJELP at 191. 
152 Lipman op cit note 149 at 4 i.
153 Ibid. 
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Another concern, which is also linked to the privilege against self- incrimination, is the 
right of access to environmental information. The Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000 regulates the constitutional right of access to information, while the access 
to environmental information is regulated by section 31 of the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) 154. The right to information in Act 2 of 2000 
differs in certain aspects with the right to environmental information in NEMA 155. The 
Act of 2000 provides for a general right to information, except in sections 46 and 70 
where an obligation is placed on a government official and the head of a private body to 
disclose information that may have an environmental risk or that may endanger the 
public, while section 31 of NEMA provides for a restricted right to environmental 
information 156. The number of grounds of refusal is greater in the Act of 2000 and their 
formulation differs from those formulated in NEMA 157•
However the right of access to information as contained in the 1996 Constitution, and 
given effect to by the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, is significant 
for environmental law because, in most cases, the relevant environmental legislation 
prevents the disclosure by an official of information and makes the unauthorized 
154 Section 6 read with Schedule J Act 2 of2000 specifically preserves section 3 J ofNEMA. There is a assumption that the logic behind preserving section 31 ofNEMA was for the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of2000 to give effect to section 32 of the 1996 Constitution, while section 3 J ofNEMA regulating access to environmental information. 
155 Du Plessis W 'The Right to Environmental Information in the New National Environmental 
Management Bill' (1998) 5 SAJELP at 402. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 40 
disdosure of such inforn:rntion a criminal offence 158. Loots argues that there is no doubt
that the validity of these clauses is subject to attack on the basis of section 32 of the Final 
Constitution, because if the corporation relies on the secrecy clause, that the public does 
not have access to such infonnation, they will have to justify the limitation of the right of 
access to such information in terms of section 36 of the Final Constitution 159.
Nevertheless one ground of refusal, contained in the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000, that raises some concerns in the quest of tightening environment 
enforcement is the mandatory protection of records (or privileged records) from 
production in legal proceedings 160• This provision mandates that requests for access to
privileged records must be refused, unless there has been a waiver of the privilege by the 
person entitled to it 161• While this provision is subject to the public interest override 162, 
the privilege appears to cover materials or records whether or not legal proceedings have 
commenced 163• Since 'privileged from production in legal proceedings' is not defined in 
the Act 164, this basically means that corporations may either invoke this privilege or their 
constitutional privilege against self- incrimination, thereby giving corporations options as 
to which one of the two privileges they may invoke. This will hinder the enforcement of 
158 Loots C 'The fmnact o[the Constitution on Environmental law' (1997) 2 SAJELP at 66- 7. Examples of 
such 'secrecy clauses' are to be found in many environment- related statutes. The Nuclear Energy Act I 3 I 
ofJ993, section 69, severely restricts the access of the public to information in connection with nuclear 
installations and sites; the Hazardous Substances Act 15 off 973, section 17, limits disclosure of 
information concerning the analysis or examination ofa sample in terms of the Act and the divulging of 
information relating to the business or affairs of any person; and the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 
45 o[/965, section 41, prohibit the disclosure of any information relating to any manufacturing process. 
159 Ibid, at 67. 
160 Section 40 (public bodies) and section 67 (private bodies), the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 
of 2000. 
161 De Waal J, Currie I and Erasmus G The Bill o{Rights Handbook 2001 at 549. 162 Mandatory disclosure in public interest: section 46 (public body) and section 70 (private body), the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 163 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus op cit note 254 at 549. 
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environmental statutes and environmental protection, in that, although 'privilege from 
production in the legal proceedings' is subject to the public interest override provision 165,
the constitutional privilege against self- incrimination seems not to be subject to such a 
clause, but merely the limitation clause 1 66.
Moreover, another privilege as contained in the Promotion of Access to Information 2 of 
2000 creates a loophole in our environmental law. Because this Act does not effectively 
regulate access to environmental information but a general access to information, thus the 
privilege created opened a can of worms. In that, the privilege of records or material from 
production in legal proceedings is just another power given to corporations. This also 
affects the public in its enforcement actions against corporate offenders, in that the term 
'legal proceedings' does not only cover criminal proceedings but also civil proceedings. 
This is evidenced by section 33 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998, which provides for private prosecution. The refusal of access to environmental 
audit documents can hinder the person who is acting in the public interest or in the 
interest of protecting the environment 167, in making up a case against the corporate 
offender. As the individual does not have the resources to accumulate enough 
information against corporate offenders, the two privileges will work against the 
individual. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Section 70 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
166 Section .36 of the Final Constitution 1996. 
167 Section 33( I )(a)- (b ), National Environmental Management Act l 07 of 1998. 
42 
This raises problems because the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 does 
not address the access to environmental information explicitly, nor does it go as far as the 
National Environmental Management Act l 07 of 1998 in providing for access to 
environmental information 168• This means that the constitutional privilege against self­
incrimination does not only pose an evidential problem in environmental criminal 
prosecution, but the problem is further exacerbated by the privilege in the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 that refuses a request of access to the relevant 
environmental audit in formation that may assist in establishing the guilt of corporate 
offenders. There is no doubt that the two privileges puts the corporations in a superior 
position, in that they will decide which information will be released for public perusal 
and which is not to be released. 
d) Access to Environmental Information in South Africa.
It must be noted that the right of access to infomiation is a valuable tool in the hands of 
environmental activists 169• This is confirmed by a court of law that noted that the right of
access to information provided for in section 32 of the Interim Constitution " ... is 
therefore, something more than a constitutional right to discovery, but is also a necessary 
adjunct to an open and democratic society committed to the principles of openness and 
accountability ... " 170
168 Kidd M 'The National Environmental Management Act and Public Participation' (1999) 6 SAJELP at
26. 
169 Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa 2000 at I 09. 
170 Ouoz�feni v Minister o{law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (EC), at 642E- G.
43 
However, in the United States (the US) the strongest bulwark against the nght of access 
to environmental information was the introduction, in 1993, of the state "audit privilege" 
Initially, the Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA) decided that all information 
generated by a self- audit can be obtained by the government and be used against the 
company for any purpose, including criminal prosecution, civil liability and enforcement 
action 172• The EPA refused to give companies, which conducted self- audits, any actual 
benefits for doing so and, quite to the contrary, created serious risks to companies for 
such activity 173• Thus, any expectation of privacy a company may have had in the results
of its investigation was conclusively removed 174•
The situation changed in 1993 when the Oregon State legislature passed the first- ever 
"audit privilege" law. In effect the essence of the audit privilege laws is as follows 175: 
► Giving corporations immunity from punishment if they self- report violations of
environmental laws; and
► Giving any documents related to the self- reporting, official secrecy, immunity from
disclosure to the public, and immunity from discovery as evidence in any legal
proceedings.
171 Carr DA Environmental Criminal Liabilitv: Avoiding and Defending Enforcement Actions 1995 at 75; 
http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/bulletin.din?Issue JD=571: 
http://www.finehummel.com/library/enviro/knowingmavhm1.htm. 
172 http://www.finehummel.com/library/enviro/knowingmayhurt.htm
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/bulletin.cfm?Issue ID=571. 
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laws 171 • 
.. 
Therefore, if a corporation conducts an erwironm�1tal self- audit of its operations, the 
informatiotJ in the self- audits cannot be_ used as evidence in any legal proceedings 
including lawsuits and/ or regulatory actions 176. A� a result, the audit privilege laws allow 
corporations to stamp documents "audit� related" and thus exempt it from public 
disclosure, discovery, or use as eviden� in any legal proceedings 177. Thus, any 
information related to a self- auditing becomes "privileged" 178•
Moreover, the Texas audit- privilege law contains additional provisions that make it a 
crime for employees or government officials to divulge anything related to environmental 
self- audits 179• Thus, if a person divulges such information and it subsequently leads to
penalties against the Polluter Company, the individual who divulged the information 
must pay the polluters' fines, penalties, and other costs 180• Rachel argue that this is a 
blatant "anti- whistle- blower" provision, clearly intended to silence individuals who 
might otherwise come forward with information about violations of law 181•
�: � !
;:"' 
What should also be noted is that the "audit privilege" laws apply not only to private 
corporations but also to the governments as well 182• Thus citizens of a municipality can 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. These laws have been passed in at least 21 States and are pending in 13 or 14 others. The States 
that have, so far, passed "audit privilege" laws include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, 
South California, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
179 http://www.rachel.org/bul!etin/bulletin.cfin?lssue 10=57 I. 
180 http://www.osbornlaw.com/Publications/Managing Enviromi1e11tal Liability.html; 
http://rachel.org/bulletin/bulletin.cfm?lssue 10=57 I. 
181 1bid. 
182 Ibid. 
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... 
governmental decision- making has direct or indirect consequences on the environment. 
For example, a particular industrial undertaking will typically require a permit to emit a 
particular type of pollutant or to conduct a specific activity, and in acquiring it will be 
required to monitor and report on its emissions 187. Hence, access to the nature of the
pollutants emitted their quantum and impact on the environment is a vital tool in the 
hands of individuals or environmental groups affected by such emissions 188.
The Act is arranged in seven parts 189, but the discussion will be restricted to Part 3 that
deals with access to records of private bodies ( co17JOrations). Before I proceed, the term 
"record" is defined as: 
.. .In relation to, a public or private body, means any recorded information­
(a) Regardless of form or medium; 
(b) In the possession or under the control of that public or private body, respectively; and
(c) Whether or not that public or private body created it, respectively 190.
Part 3 of the Act provides for access to records of private bodies or corporatiom-191. A 
requester (either the public or government) must be given· access to any record of a 
private body if: 
► That record is requested for the exercise or protection of any rights;
186 Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa 2000 at 111. 
187 Ibid, at 111- 12. 
188 Ibid, at 112. 
189 Part I deals with the introductory provisions, including definitions and objectives of the Act; Part 2 
deals with access to records of public bodies; Part 3 deals with access to records of private bodies; Part 4 
deals with appeals; Part 5 grants the Human Rights Commission certain additional powers and functions; 
while Part 6 and 7 deals with transactional and general matters respectively. 
lW Section I Definitions. 
191 Sections 50- 73. Italics own emphasis. 
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► That person complies with the procedural requirements m this Act relating to a
request for access to that record; and
► Access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in
Chapter 4 of this Part.
However, grounds for refusal 192, headed "Commercial Information of a Private Body", 
provides for the head of a co17Joration to refuse a request for access to a record of the 
corporation if the record-
► Contains trade secrets of the co,poration;
► Contains financial, commercial, scientific or teclmical information, other than trade
secrets, of the corporation, the disclosure of which would be likely to cause harm to
the commercial or financial interests of the corporation;
► Contains information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected, to put
the corporation at a disadvantage in contractual or other negotiations, or to prejudice
the corporation in commercial competition; or
► Is a computer program, as defined in section l (1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978,
owned by the corporation, except insofar as it is required to give access to a record to
which access is granted in terms of this Act.
But a record may not be refused in terms of subsection (1) insofar as it consists of 
information about the results of any product or environmental testing or other 
investigation supplied by, carried out by or on behalf of the corporation and its disclosure 
192 Sections 62- 70. 
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would reveal a serious public safety or environmental risk 193. Nevertheless, this 
provision, along with certain others, can be trumped in certain circumstances, namely, 
where: 
a) The disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of-
i) A substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the law; or 
ii) Imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk; and
b) The public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the harm
contemplated in the provision in question 194• 
Although it is apparent from the above that no distinction is made in the Act between 
environmental and other information, it, however, includes reference to "public safety or 
environmental risks" 195• Hence the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 is 
welcome insofar as it fleshes out the constitutional right of access to information 
generally and includes environmental considerations, though it imposes onerous 
bureaucratic obligations on both public and private entities 196 • However, the Act still 
faces serious challenge of how it will be applied in practice 197• 193 Section 68. "Public safety or environmental risk" is defined as ... harm or risk to the environment or the 
public (including individuals in their workplace) associated with-
a) A product or service which is available to the public; 
b) A substance released into the environment, including, but not limited to, the workplace;
c) A substance intended for human or animal consumption;
d) A means of pub I ic transport; or
e) An installation or manufacturing process or substance, which is used in that installation or process.
(Section I Definition).194 Section 70. 
195 Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa 2000 at 111. 196 Ibid, af 115. 
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► The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.
As regard access to environmental information under NEMA, every person is entitled to 
have access to. information held by the State and organs of State which relates to the 
implementation of this Act and any other law affecting the environment, and to the state 
of the environment and actual and future threats to the environment, including any 
emissions to water, air or soil and the production, handling, transportation, treatment, 
storage and disposal of hazardous waste and substances 198. This section when interpreted 
broadly gives citizens and juristic persons wide-ranging right of access to environmental 
inforl1?,ation held by the government. 
In addition, the government is entitled to have access to information relating to the state 
of the environment and actual and future threats to the environment, including any 
emissions to water, air or soil and the production, handling, transportation, treatment, 
storage and disposal of hazardous waste, held by corporations where that information is 
necessary to enable the government to carry out their duties in terms of the provisions of 
this Act or any other law concerned with the protection of the environment or sustainable 
use of natural resources 199.
However, a request for information contemplated in the former request can be refused 
only-
► If the request is manifestly unreasonable or formulated in too general manner;
197 Ibid. 
198 SeQtign. 31 (l)(a) NF.MA, 
199 Section 31 (I )(a) NEMA. 
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, If the public order or national security would be negatively affected by the supply of 
the information; or 
, For the reasonable protection of commercially confidential information: 
► If the granting of information endangers or further endangers the protection of the
environment; and
r For the reasonable protection of personal privacy200.
However, with regard to the I ight of the words " ... pending the promulgation of such 
statute, the following shall apply ... " in section 31(1) ofNEMA, it could be assumed that 
with the subsequent passing of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
section 31 falls away201. However. Glazewski states that this is not the case as section 6 
read with Schedule 1 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
specifically preserves section 31 of NEMA202• This means that the right of access to 
environmental information in South Africa is governed by two enactments, namely the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, and the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998. 
, Basic Conditions of Emplo ment Act 75 of 1997 
Another enactment that deals with disclosure or access to information is the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. In terms of the BCEA, the Director- General 
or Labour inspector may require any person in the corporation, either in writing or orally, 
to furnish or disclose any information, book, document or o�ject that is material to an 
200 Section 31(1)© NEMA. 
201 Glazewski J Environmental law in South A/i-ica 2000 at 118. 
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. . . 1 · 1 I I I �m M I 111vcst1gat1011 or to ,v 11c 1 an cmp oyment aw re ales  ·. orcover. t 1ese persons may 
not refuse to answer any relevant question by the Director- General or Labour inspector 
that he or she is legally obliged to answcr204. The RCEA, therefore, allow the designated
persons access to corporation's books, documents, information or object without any 
restrictions. 
However, 'no answer' by any person to a question by the person conducting the 
investigation in tem1s of section 53 or by the labour inspector in terms of section 66 may 
be used against that person in any criminal prrn..:cedings20�. This provision affords the 
privilege against self- incrimination to corporate officers. This is due to the fact that 
corporations cannot answer questions, but corporate officer's act or answer on its behalf. 
It, logically, follows that only those ·answers' that incriminate the corporate officers 
personally are privileged in any criminal proceedings. In this regard two concerns, in a 
form of questions, may be highlighted: 
,- Does the privilege, in the context of the above provision, also extend to corporations 
as juristic or artificial persons? If so; 
,- Does it includes the information, books, documents, or object disclosed on behalf of 
the corporation that does not incriminate corporate officers, but only serve as 
incriminate evidence against the corporation? 202 Ibid.203 Sections 53(1) and 66(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
204 Sections 53(2) and 67( I) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 205 Section 91 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997.
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By way of illustration with two cases decided bef-ore the Act No. 2 of 2000, in Van 
I-!uvssteen NO and others 1' Minister o[Environmental A//i,irs and Tourism and others206
where the applicant sought an order compelling the respondent Minister to furnish all 
available documentation concerning the construction of a steel mill plant at Saldanha 
Bay. The court acknowledged that the right of access to information is not absolute and 
unqualified207, and held that in the present case there was no question of a possible 
limitation under the limitation clause under the Interim Constitution208 . The order sought 
was therefore granted. 
While in Goodman Bros. (Pt\') Ltd. v Transnet Ltd. 209, where ·the applicant sought an 
order compelling the release of documents concerning the evaluation of the tender to 
supply wristwatches to the respondent. The court noted that an unrestricted right of 
access to documents in possession of a public body could easily lead to abuse but some 
protection had to be afforded against the oppressive consequences of State secrecy which 
previously existed210• The court held that there had to be a reasonable basis for believing 
that the disclosure of documents in possession of the State would assist the applicant in 
protecting his or her right211• The court, further, emphasised that the right of access to 
infonnation did not entitle the applicant to information to determine whether a right was 
206 1995(9)BCLR 1191 ©. 
207 At I 208E- F. 
WR Section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
209 1998 (8) BCLR I 024 (W). 
210 As a result the court approved the SA Metal Machinerl' Co. lid. v Transnet Ltd Unreported case (W) for 
Witwatersrand and local division dated 22 March 1998. 
211 1998 (8) BCLR 1024 (W). at 1034G- H. 
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threatened or infringed. More is needed than just an unsubstantiated apprehension of 
harm to invoke the right212• The application was dismissed. 
As these cases were decided before the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the 
challenge in practice is which approach are the courts going to follow: 
a) Is it the one where the public bodies are exempted from disclosing certain
information to the public or juristic person; or
b) The one where both the public and private bodies are obliged to release any
information relating to the degradation of the environment?
In any of the approaches that the court might choose in the near future, the most 
challenging question that they have to deal with is the privilege against self­
incrimination contained in section 35(3)0) of the Final Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. The question of whether or not this right is applicable to corporations is 
answered by section 8( 4) of the Final Constitution, which provides that juristic persons 
are entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the 
rights and the nature of that juristic person. 
An examination of the privilege against self- incrimination in relation to environmental 
crimes in other jurisdictions will now be discussed. 
212 At I 036E. 
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e) Examination of the Position in Other Countries.
-, The United States o(America. 
The consideration of the privilege against self- incrimination in the United States (US) 
has been in the context of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution213. The Fifth 
Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself. . .''214. As a corporation cannot be a witness, this clearly could not 
apply to corporations215• While the Fifth Amendment does protect corporate officers, it 
does not extend to corporations216• As a result corporate offenders cannot prevent 
disclosure of incriminating information to government prosecutors, while corporate 
officers may invoke the privilege and refuse to testify, thereby depriving the corporation 
of the benefit of their testimony and generating adverse inferences from the fact finder217.
The corporation is required to appoint an agent who can, without fear of self­
incrimination, furnish corporate documents (or environmental audit documents) 
requested by the government218 • If no such agent is available, the court will either stay the 
discovery or issue a protective order219•
Importantly however is that the American Supreme Court is more realistic about the 
tangible effects for individuals of its decision to deny the privilege to corporations220• In 
Bellis v United States the court stated the accepted law that "an individual cannot rely 
m Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Real/v Have a Right to Silence Since Caltex and Abbco 
lceworks? · (1996) 13 EPLJ at 370. 
214 US Constitution Amendment V. 215 Puls op cit note 2 IO at 370. 216 Carr DA Environmental Criminal liabi/i()1: Avoiding and De/ending Enforcement Actions 1995 at 90. 
117 Ibid. 218 United States v Kordel 397 U.S. /, 8 (1970). 219 Carr op cit note 213 at 90. See also A[i-o- Lecon, inc. v United States, 820 F. 2d I 198. I 206- 07 (Fed 
Cir. 1987). 
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upon the privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective entity which are in his 
possession in a representative capacity, even if these records might incriminate him 
personally"221. While in Braswell v United State./:!:' a company officer claimed he could
not produce corporate documents for which he had been subpoenaed to produce on the 
basis that they would incriminate him223 • As the company had no privilege he could not 
claim the privilege on the company's behalf and so he sought it as his personal right. but 
the court upheld the Bellis dccision224•
► Canada.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "no accused person be 
required to act as a witness"22�. The Charter also provides that "everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of person and the right not to be deprived of that except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice"226• As a corporation cannot be a 
witness, this clearly could not apply to corporations227 . The privilege under section 7 of 
the Charter may seem to apply in cases where denying it to a corporation would 
effectively deny it to individual corporate officers228. 120 Puls op cit note 2 I 3 at 3 70. 221 417 US 85 (1974) at 88. 222 487 us 99 (1988).
m Puls op cit note 213 at 370. 
224 Ibid. 225 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S I I ©. 226 Ibid, S 7. 
227 Puls op cit note 220 at 370. 228 R v Bata Industries lid. {No. I) (1992) 70 CCC (3 dJ 391 at 392. 
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However. in R r Batu lndust,:ies Ltd. 229 where the managing director and the company 
were charged with the same environmental offences, the managing director succeeded in 
having a report excluded in the company's trial because it incriminated him as well230. 
The court held that section 7 of the Chmtcr provided a privilege against self-­
incrimination that does not extend to corporations unless it is necessary to protect the life. 
liberty or security of a human being231 . 
.J,i'" New Zealand. 
In New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Mas/er & Sons ltd. 232• the court
stated New Zealand's position in the following statement: 
"There seems no policy reason why a corporation should not avail itself of the rule (or the privilege). A 
Corporation acts and makes statements through ce1tain responsible officers ... It is identified in law with the 
acts and defaults of its directors and officers, and it may make admissions through them. Indeed, in this 
case ... the actions and statements of the directors ... led to the bringing of the charge ... If then the 
prosecution may prove its case by the out of Court statements of its directors, it seems reasonable that the 
company should be entitled to claim self- incrimination when it speaks through them"m. 
The court considered it "unrealistic" to deny the officers of those companies the privilege 
against self- incrimination "just because they have changed the legal status of the 
business for considerations which are irrelevant to the issue of self- incriminating 
229 R v Bat a Industries Lid. (No. I) (19921 70 CCC (3 dJ 39 I. 
230 -Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Reall)' Have a Right to Silence Since Caltex and Abbc:o
lceworks? '(1996) 13 EPLJ at 370. 
231 Ibid. 
::
3
: [1986) I NZLR 191. 233 Ibid, at 196. 
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d · · "234 Tl . - I I" d "fi . I a m1ss1ons . 1e court appears very consc1ous o1 t 1c "unrea an art! 1cia result
which denying the privilege to companies could have2Y'_ 
,- United Kingdom. 
In the United Kingdom the privilege against self- incrimination was dealt with in Jstel 
Ltd. v Tul/\ >236• 
The court argued: "the privilege can only be justified on two grounds, first that it 
discourages the ill- treatment of a suspect and secondly that it discourages the production 
of dubious confessions ... It is difficult to see any reason why in civil [or corporate 
crinzinal} proceedings the privilege should be exercisable so as to enable a litigant [or 
corporate offender,\} to refuse relevant and even vital documents which are in his 
possession or power and which speak for themselves ... I regard the privilege against self­
incrimination exercisable in civil [or corporate criminal} proceedings as an archaic and 
unjustified survival from the past. .. "237.
The court also acknowledged that Parliament has recognised in a piecemeal fashion that 
the privilege against self- incrimination _is profoundly unsatisfactory when no question of
m Ibid. at 197. 
m Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Rea/IF Have a Right to Silence Since Cal/ex and Abbco
/cewurks?' ( 1996) 13 EPLJ at 371. 
136 [ 1993] AC 45. This was an appeal from the Court of Appeal. In an action by the plaintiff against various 
defendants, including Mr. and Mrs. Tully, Buckley Jon 05 June 1991 granted the plaintiff ex parte 
injunctive relief requiring Mr. and Mrs. Tully, inter alia, to disclose all dealings relating to certain moneys 
(referred to in a schedule to the order and all sums and assets representing or derived from such moneys, 
and to exhibit copies of all documents which related to the receipt or transfer of all dealing with all such 
assets). By paragraph 33 of the order it was provided that no such disclosure should be used as evidence in 
the prosecution ofan offence alleged to have been committed by Mr. and Mrs. Tully. On an application by 
Mr. and Mrs. Tully, Wright J made an order on 20 august 1991 setting aside the disclosure order on the 
ground that it infringed their privilege against self- incrimination, [at 47). 
217 Ibid, at 53. Italics own additions and emphasis. 
58 
ill- treatment or dubious conl'cssions is involvcd23" The court upheld th� ('ou11 of Appeal 
decision because. the court reasoned. Mr. Tully was seeking to exploit the privilege 
against self- incrimination in order to frustrate the plaintiffs claims2J9 • 
► Australia.
The High Corni of Australia in Envh·onmental Protection Authoril\' (EPA) v Caltex 
Relining Co. Ptv Ltd. 240 decided on whether the privilege against self- incrimination· 
should be extended to corporations at common law, or not. In this case, the Caltex 
Refining Company had attempted to claim the privilege against self- incrimination to 
avoid production of documents required by notice under section 29(2)(a) of the Clean 
Waters Act 1970 of the New South Wales (NSW) and a similar notice to produce made 
under the rules of the NSW Land and Environment Court241 . 
Stein J in the Land and Environment Court, by reference to US authorities, held that the 
privilege was not available to corporations at common law242 . 
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, through Gleeson CJ with whom Mahoney JA and 
McLelland JA agreed, held that at common law the privilege against self- incrimination 
was available to corporations243 , and the EPA appealed to the High Court. 
rn Ibid. 
m Ibid, at 57. 
240 (1993)68ALJR 127. 
241 Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Rea/fr Have a Right to Silence Since Ca!tex and Abbco 
lceworks?' ( 1996) I 3 EPLJ at 366. 
242 State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC, later renamed EPA v Caltex Re inin, Co. P ltd. r /991 
74 LGRA 212. 
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I 
Lipman, correctly, argues that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal was 
somewhat startling, in that internal environmental auditing by corporations is the 
cornerstone of the current system of pollution control 244 . As the EPA or environmental 
authorities does not have the resources to conduct its own monitoring and is largely 
reliant on self- monitoring by corporations, accordingly the EPA or environmental 
authorities would be placed in a position of great difficulty in attempting to enforce 
pollution control statutes if corporations self- monitoring records were unavailable for 
use in criminal proceedi ngs245 .
The High Court of Australia, by a majority of four to three246, held that the privilege does 
not, at common law, extend to protect corporations. The majority examined the history 
and rationale for the privilege, and stated that the privilege is a human right designed to 
protect individuals from oppressive methods of obtaining evidence and should thus not be 
extended to artificial entities247. The court also pointed out that: 
'Groups frequently are powerful and their illegal doings frequently are provable only by their records; 
and ... economic crimes ... are usually not even discoverable without access to business records'248• 
The minority did not see the privilege as being exclusively related to notions of personal 
rights and freedoms249. Instead they emphasised the place of the privilege in the
243 SPCC v Caltex Relining Co. Ptv Ltd. (1991) 74 LGRA 46. at 54. 
"
44 Lipman Z 'Corporations. Crime and the Environment' (1997) 4 SAJELP at 84. 
245 Ibid. 
246 The majority judges were Mason CJ, Toohey, Brennan and McHugh JJ. Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ 
formed the minority. 
247 Lipman op cit note 241 at 85. 
248 EPA v Caltex Refining Co. Pt)' ltd. (1993} 68 ALJR 127, at /36 per Mason CJ and Toohe1•. 
249 Puls J 'Corporate Privilege- Do Directors Reallv Have a Right o(Silence Since Caltex and Abbco 
lceworks?'(\996) 13 EPLJ at 366. 
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adversarial system, reiterating the principle of common law that ''those who allege the 
commission of a crime should prove it themselves and should not be able to compel the 
d 'd f . I . lf'2c;o accuse to prov1 e proo · agamst umse · . 
As a result of this decision, the Australian EPA is now placed in a very strong position in 
enforcing the various statutes in the control of corporate environmental crime(s )251• 
However, a possible drawback is that the decision may discourage corporations from 
undertaking voluntary cnviromnental audits because of the fear that it might reveal a 
breach on environmental statutes or permit, thereby exposing itself and its corporate 
officers to civil or criminal liability252 . 
Although the High Court left open the question of whether corporate officers retain 
personal rights to the privilege when ordered to produce documents on behalf of the 
corporation which could incriminate them personally, the Comi stressed that the outcome 
did not affect the right of natural persons to claim the privilege253 • This view assumes that 
there is a clear legal separation of corporations and its officers254• Thus it fails to take into 
account provisions in most environmental statutes, which hold corporate officers 
personally liable for acts of the company255. It is, therefore, arguable that following the 
decision in Caltex, corporate officers could as a result of their corporation being 
250 EPA v Caltex Relining Cq. Pt11 ltd. (1993) 68 ALJR 127 per Deane. Dawson and Gaudron .I.I. 
251 Lipman op cit note 241 at 85. 252 1bid. 253 EPA v Caltex Relining Co. Prv ltd. (1993) 68 ALJR 127 ner Mason CJ and TooheJ1J. 
254 Lipman supra. 
!
55 Lipman supra. 
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compelled to discover incriminating evidence, be personally liable and exposed to 
criminal sanctions2�".
Firstly, from common law perspective- of whether the privilege against self-­
incrimination should be extended to corporations? The Australian High Court decision in 
the case of EPA v Caltex Refining Co. Pt1· Ltd. seems to be accommodative of our 
common law. In that section 8(3)(b) of our Final Constitution permit our courts to 
develop the rules of our common law in limiting any right in the Bill of Rights, including 
but not limited to the privilege against self- incrimination, provided the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36( 1 ). It is submitted that the limitation of 
the privilege when it comes to corporations may be reasonable and justified, because the 
privilege from its common law development was always developed within the context of 
being classified as a human right exercised only by natural persons and not juristic or 
artificial persons. This is evidenced by the majority decision of the Australian High 
Court in the above case, where it was held that, at common law, the privilege does not 
extend to corporations because, firstly, the privilege is a human right designed to protect 
individuals from oppressive methods of obtaining evidence, and secondly, groups [or 
artificial entities] frequently are powerful and their illegal doings frequently are provable 
only by their records ... 257. 
With regard to the Constitutional perspective, lessons may be learned from both the 
United States of America and Canada approaches. Because in both these countries the 
256 Lipman supra. See also Puls J 'Corporate Privilege-- Do Directors Reali!' Have a Right to Silence Since 
Caltex and Abbco lceworks?' (1996) 13 EPLJ 364. 
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privilege is contained and addressed in the context of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, which arc as 
important documents in those countries as our Final Constitution. 
From the United States approach, our courts, in limiting the privilege, may appoint any 
person to be agents who can without any fear of self- incrimination furnish the corporate 
documents requested by the State. The court should have discretion in designating such a 
person. This approach may, in turn, accommodate the Canadian approach that provides 
that the privilege against self- incrimination should only be afforded to individual 
corporate officers, as it is a human right. 
This limitation may be reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36( I) of our Final 
Constitution, because by limiting the extension of the privilege to corporations the right 
to a healthy environment (section 24) will not be compromised. Whereas, when 
extending the privilege to corporations will subject citizens of our country to an 
environment that is harmful to their health and well- being. Thereby hindering the State 
in performing its constitutional duty of affording every citizen an opportunity of enjoying 
a healthy environment. 
Next are suggestions and recommendations for the enforcement of our Criminal 
Environmental Statutes. 
257 EPA v Caltex Refining Co. Pty Ltd. (1993} 68 ALJR 127 at 136 as per Mason CJ and Toohev. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion. 
Recommendations and Suggestions for South African Criminal E11viro11me11tal 
Legislation. 
,- Should the Constitutional Privilef!e Against Se//: Incrimination he Ex/ended to 
Corporations or Not? 
Our country has a very unique and well- written Constitution that includes the Bill of 
Rights258, which guarantee both natural and juristic persons the right 'not to be compelled 
to give self- incriminating evidence'259. Adding to this, natural persons are entitled to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being260. 
What this means is that the government and corporations must respect the right of natural 
person to enjoy a healthy environment261. In Minister o(Health and Welfare v Woodcarb
(Ptv) Ltd. and other262, where Hurt J stated that: "[t] he generation of smoke in these 
circumstances, in the teeth of the law as it were, is an infringement of the rights of the 
respondents neighbours to 'an environment which is not detrimental to their health or 
well being ... " This dictum means that corporations are prohibited, by our constitution, in 
polluting the environment as a whole and if they contravene section 24 of the 
constitution, the State is obliged, in terms section 24(b) of our constitution, to take action 
25
R Chapter 2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
259 Section 35(3)(j) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
260 Section 24(a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
261 Commentators are now in agreement that the Bill of Rights does have horizontal effect but the extent of 
such horizontal application is still debated. Further see Glazewski J Environmental law in South Ali'ica 
2000 at 88; Davis (et al) Fundamemal Rights in the New Constitution Commentan• and Cases 1997 at 43;
Cockrell 'Private Law and the Bill o{Rights: a threshold issue o{horizontalit1•' in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 1997 3A l- ! 7· Cheadle and Davis 'Tb.i!. ApplicaliQJ1...QLJ.he /...2.QQ_C.on{?J..ituti.mJ.m,Jhe Pi'i'!!�li.t;; 
Sphere' (1997) 13 SAJHR 44.
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against the corporate polluter. This kind of action is taken either through reasonable 
legislative or "other measures" the State may deem fit against that corporate polluter. 
Moreover, this type of action should be taken with an objective of preventing pollution or 
industrial pollution on behalf of natural persons263 . 
As the words "other measures" arc not defined in our constitution, therefore one cannot 
escape the fact that the State is given wide discretion with regard to dealing with 
corporate polluters. From an environmental context, it is submitted, that the words "other 
measures" be given wide interpretation when it comes to corporate polluters. This may, 
therefore, include the limitation of the corporate polluter's privilege against self­
incrimination264. 
The limitation of the corporate polluter's privilege is relevant when it comes to the 
prosecution of the corporate polluter for the alleged environmental crime. Where the 
corporate offender invoke the privilege against self- incrimination, with regard to the 
disclosure and discovery of environmental auditing documents, the court may weigh the 
two competing rights, namely the right to a healthy environment and the privilege against 
self- incrimination, and limit the corporate polluter's privilege in this regard. Put 
differently, without these documents the State will not be able to prove its case against 
the corporate offender. Basically these documents, if discovered, can form the basis of 
the State case. It is for these reasons that the court should limit the privilege against self­
incrimination in its application to corporations. 262 1996 (3) SA 155 (N). 263 Section 24(b )(i) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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What is also crucial about this matter is that the courts should, when deciding on this 
matter, be cautious about the fact that this matter is an environmental matter and not a 
criminal matter. Therefore the courts should take note of the fact that the environment as 
whole is fragile and should be protected as such. Not only should the environment be, 
always, protected when the damage is done. But, the courts, in their decisions should 
promote co- operation between the State and corporations so as to allow both parties to 
come up with reasonable proactive measures that would prevent the degradation of our 
environment. This kind of co- operation can benefit both the State and the corporations, 
in that the State will be fulfilling its duty in terms of section 24(b) of our constitution 
while the corporations, by releasing their environmental audits for inspection to the State 
will help them identify whether their activities amount to a breach of either a statute or 
permit. If the audits are released early, the corporation can be able to take the necessary 
steps in avoiding the potential degradation of the environment as well as the potential 
breach. Therefore co- operation between the State and the corporations is vital in order 
for the natural individual to enjoy his or her constitutional right to a healthy environment. 
�r,.i This is to be done in terms of section 36 of our Constitution. 
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Conclusion 
ln our modern times environmental cnmc has been extended to the activities of 
corporations265. However. the criminal law was primarily developed 111 the context of 
individual offenders and many practical difficulties have ansen 111 its application to 
corporations266. One difficulty that has been identified and analyzed in this paper is that 
traditional protections afforded to natural persons may operate unfairly when applied to 
large well- resourced corporations267.
In South Africa, as submitted above, it 1s argued that the privilege against self­
incrimination should not be extended to corporate offenders when it comes to serious 
environmental crime268• horn an environmental context, the privilege of corporate 
offender may be justifiably limited for the protection of the environment and thus 
protecting the public's constitutional right to a healthy environment. However. a South 
African court may reach the same conclusion as the Australian High Court in relation to 
the extension of the privilege to corporate offenders. If the privilege is abrogated with 
respect to corporate offenders, it may be necessary for the court to clarify with certainty 
whether corporate officers are protected in circumstances where they are compelled to 
discover incriminating evidence on behalf of their corporations. 
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid. 267 Lipman op cit note 361 at 90.2611 Lipman op cit note 361 at 86.
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